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In search-and-matching models, the nonlinear nature of search frictions increases average
unemployment rates during periods with higher volatility. These frictions are not, however,
by themselves sufficient to raise unemployment following an increase in perceived uncer-
tainty; though they may do so in conjunction with the common assumption of wages being
determined by Nash bargaining. Importantly, option-value considerations play no role in
the standard model with free entry. In contrast, when the mass of entrepreneurs is finite and
there is heterogeneity in firm-specific productivity, a rise in perceived uncertainty robustly
increases the option value of waiting and reduces job creation.
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1 Introduction
There is a large empirical literature which demonstrates that uncertainty is time-varying and
that increased volatility negatively affects macroeconomic activity; even an increase in perceived
uncertainty has been shown to lead to negative outcomes.1 Understanding the mechanisms behind
these empirical results is not trivial. In fact, several models would predict the opposite. Precautionary
motives call forth a rise in savings, which in many macroeconomic models would be associated
with increased investment. Also, limited liability means that firm owners’ payoff function is convex,
which implies that uncertainty increases firm equity value and makes investment more attractive.
Leduc and Liu (2016) provide important contributions to both the empirical and the theoretical
literature. Empirically, they show that an increase in observed perceived uncertainty leads to an
increase in the unemployment rate. Moreover, they demonstrate that a standard search-and-matching
model (SaM) can replicate this finding, whereas – as pointed out above – many other theoretical
models cannot. In fact, they show that such a model can generate the desired result even under
flexible prices and with prudent agents, a combination that, by itself, typically pushes economic
activity in the opposite direction. Leduc and Liu (2016) do not bring to the surface what mechanism
lies behind this result. But they conjecture that matching frictions produce the famous option value
of postponing investment; increased uncertainty can make it more attractive to wait and postpone
investment, including vacancy-posting, under certain conditions (cf. Bernanke (1983)).2
The first contribution of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of the effects of increased
volatility in SaM models, examining in particular whether there is an option-value channel. Since
job creation is very much like an irreversible investment, as the associated costs are not refundable,
the option-value channel is a sensible candidate to consider. However, a key finding of this paper
1On which see, among many others, Jurado et al. (2015), Baker et al. (2016), and Bloom et al. (2018). For excellent
surveys of the literature, see Bloom (2014) and Fernández-Villaverde and Guerrón-Quintana (2020).
2An additional contribution of Leduc and Liu (2016) is to show the importance of embedding their SaM framework
into a New Keynesian framework with price rigidities. Together with a nonlinear household utility function, these
give rise to an aggregate demand channel which ensures that the model can generate quantitatively substantial effects
following uncertainty shocks. This paper, however, focuses exclusively on the case with flexible prices. Even though
we acknowledge that the demand channel is important for the quantitative impact of uncertainty shocks, keeping our
focus on the flexible-price case makes the analysis more transparent.
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is that the nonlinearities of the matching function by themselves are not enough for an increase
in perceived uncertainty to have an effect on the economy. In fact, we show that Leduc and Liu’s
(2016) result that an increase in perceived uncertainty leads to an increase in the unemployment rate
in a standard SaM model with flexible prices depends crucially on the assumption that wages are
determined by Nash bargaining, an assumption that is often adopted in the SaM literature. However,
it is not an integral part of the SaM framework; many other types of wage setting assumptions are
possible. Specifically, we show that changes in perceived uncertainty have no effect on job creation
when wages are linear in productivity. Thus, the standard SaM features themselves do not lead to
any option value of waiting. The intuition is simple. The free-entry assumption implies that the
expected value of vacancy posting is, and will always remain, equal to zero. Hence, there is no point
to waiting. However, the nonlinearities of the matching friction do imply that the average value
of labor market tightness – that is, the number of vacancies relative to the number of unemployed
workers searching for a job – is elevated during periods of higher realized volatility. Under Nash
bargaining, this improves workers’ bargaining position and raises the average wage. Even if higher
volatility is not realized, the increase in wages is driven by what agents expect to happen when
perceived uncertainty increases. As a result, the firm value falls, which reduces job creation.
The literature often focuses on the impact of an increase in perceived uncertainty, that is, the
impact that is solely due to beliefs, not to an actual increase in volatility. Our second contribution is
to highlight the importance of analyzing the impact of realized increases in volatility (measured as
the impact averaged over all possible realizations). As made clear in the preceding paragraph, one
reason is that model predictions for the effect of an increase in perceived uncertainty are determined
by what agents expect to happen during the period of heightened volatility. Moreover, both in the
standard SaM and in modifications we consider, we find that even if the anticipation of uncertainty
itself does have a non-zero impact on the economy, these effects are small relative to those induced
by realized volatility. What is more, the effects of realized and perceived volatility can differ in sign
along the IRF over at least some horizons.
Our third contribution is to demonstrate how wait-and-see considerations can be introduced into
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the SaM framework. We proceed in two steps. Our starting point is to observe that virtually all SaM
models assume that there are always enough potential entrepreneurs available to drive the expected
profits of job creation to zero. We first highlight that an option-value channel is in principle possible
by relaxing the free-entry condition and assuming that the mass of entrepreneurs is finite.3 However,
the resulting channel is only operative under restrictive assumptions. In particular, the free-entry
condition must be binding in some states, such that firms make zero profits, but not in others, such
that firms make positive profits. In a second step, we therefore add heterogeneity in idiosyncratic
firm-productivity alongside the assumption of a finite mass of entrepreneurs. In the resulting SaM
framework, there is a time-varying measure of entrepreneurs (i.e., those with a sufficiently high
productivity draw) that always expect to make strictly positive profits when they post a vacancy.
With this relatively simple modification, the model robustly predicts that perceived uncertainty leads
to a postponement of job creation.
The reason is that an expected increase in future volatility increases an unmatched entrepreneur’s
chance of having a productivity draw for which expected profits of vacancy-posting are positive,
whereas the downside risk is not affected since unmatched entrepreneurs can always choose to
stay out of the market. Importantly, the introduction of heterogeneity often leads to substantial
challenges for solution methods, but this is not the case here; indeed our proposed model can be
solved by (higher-order) perturbation methods.
Our study is connected to two broad strands of the economic literature, namely, analyses
considering frictional labor market models and the effects of uncertainty, respectively. While each
of these literatures is vast in scope, we briefly comment on the most closely related studies. In
particular, Bloom (2009) offers a seminal examination of the sort of real-options effects analyzed
also in this paper. His model incorporates option-value considerations in hiring and (physical)
investment space due to non-convex adjustment costs. We consider a particularly prominent variant
of adjustment costs, namely search frictions in the labor market, and identify the conditions under
3We thus share with Coles and Kelishomi (2018) an emphasis on the restrictive nature of the standard free-entry
condition Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework. While their study identifies the empirical difficulties caused by
adopting this assumption with respect to level shocks, we concentrate on the implications of this assumption for the
effects of uncertainty shocks and, in particular, the presence or absence of option-value effects.
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which an option-value effect materializes; and when it does not.
Considering studies that share this focus – and beyond Leduc and Liu (2016), discussed in
detail above –, the most closely related paper is Schaal (2017).4 That paper develops a model with
multi-worker firms that are heterogeneous in productivity and which are subject to an endogenous
linear hiring cost at the firm level.5 In similarity to our proposed model, the resulting irreversibility
gives rise to an option value of waiting. In contrast to our approach, the free-entry condition binds
in every state of the world. The reason that the value of vacancy-posting nonetheless varies over
time in Schaal’s (2017) setup is that firms operate a decreasing returns to scale technology, and
the free-entry condition obtains at the level of the (multi-worker) firm rather than the vacancy.
Moreover, Schaal (2017) assumes directed search. Given our starting point, we instead try to stay as
close as possible to the canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides assumptions of constant returns
to scale in production and random search, while restoring an option-value channel.
The next section describes the SaM model of Leduc and Liu (2016) with linear utility and
flexible prices. Section 3.1 reports the effects on the economy both to an increase in perceived
uncertainty as well as to an increase in volatility that does indeed materialize. Sections 3.2-3.4
dissect the model and analyze the results in detail to reach a full understanding of the role of
matching frictions and wage setting for the impact of uncertainty shocks on economic activity.
Section 4 discusses our modifed SaM model in which there is an option value of postponing job
creation. The last section concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we describe the basic search-and-matching (SaM) model. The two main differences
with Leduc and Liu (2016) are that we restrict ourselves to the flexible price version of the model
and assume that the representative household is risk neutral. Both assumptions are common in
4Fasani and Rossi’s (2018) comment on Leduc and Liu (2016) likewise discusses the results through the lens of
option-value effects.
5For a related approach, see Riegler (2019).
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the matching literature. For us they have the benefit of making the analysis more transparent.
Specifically, as shown in Bernanke (1983) and our example in section 3.2, the option value of
waiting does not rely on risk aversion.6 Nor are sticky prices necessary.
2.1 Households
The representative household consists of a unit-mass of workers and of a potentially infinite number
of entrepreneurs.7 In a given period t, a worker can either be employed, nt , or unemployed, ut .
Non-employed members of the household may find a job even within the period they get displaced.
Thus, the measure of the household’s members that are searching for a job in the beginning of a
period is given by ust = ut−1 +δnt−1, where δ denotes an exogenous separation rate. The measure
of employed individuals working in period t is therefore given by nt = ftust +(1−δ )nt−1, where ft
denotes an endogenously determined job finding rate. The real wage is denoted by wt . In addition
to labor income, the household receives net-profits, dt , from the corporate sector.
The household’s utility depends on the amount consumed, ct , and the mass of household
members working, the latter being weighted by the disutility of working, χ , such that
U(ct ,nt) = ct−χnt . (1)
The budget constraint of the household is given by8
ct = wtnt +dt . (2)
6Risk aversion does introduce other channels through which uncertainty affects economic outcomes. For example,
Freund and Rendahl (2020) explain how risk aversion can lead to a larger impact of uncertainty shocks through changes
in the required risk premium. We discuss the role of risk aversion in online appendix OB .
7That is, there is never a shortage of entrepreneurs. As explained in section 4, whether there is or is not a binding
constraint on the number of potential entrants turns out to be crucial for the presence of an option value of waiting
mechanism in SaM models.
8To maximize transparency, we assume that the aggregate resources devoted to vacancy-posting, to be discussed
shortly, are rebated back to the household.
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2.2 Search frictions
The total number of period-t matches, mt , depends on the number of workers searching for a job, ust ,
and the number of vacancies, vt , as specified by a standard, Cobb-Douglas matching function
mt = ψ(vt)1−α(ust )
α , (3)
which exhibits constant returns to scale. The implied hiring rate, ht , and implied job finding rate, ft ,








= ψθ 1−αt , (5)





The law of motion for employment is given by
nt = (1−δ )nt−1 +mt . (7)
These nt workers constitute nt one-worker firms producing the intermediate good.
2.3 Firms and job creation
There are intermediate goods producing firms, final goods producing firms, and retail firms. More-
over, there is a potentially infinite mass of entrepreneurs with the ability to post vacancies and, thus,
create one-worker firms.
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Intermediate goods producers. Each of the active firms produces zt units of output at a (relative)
price equal to x in terms of the final consumption good. The only input is labor and the value of zt
is determined by the following process
zt = (1−ρz)z+ρzzt−1 +σt−1εz,t , (8)
ln(σt) = (1−ρσ ) ln(σ)+ρσ ln(σt−1)+σσ εσ ,t , (9)
where εz,t and εσ ,t are iid standard Normal processes. The steady-state value of productivity, z, is
normalized to unity. Uncertainty shocks are associated with changes in εσ ,t . This specification of
the stochastic processes is common in the literature, but deviates from Leduc and Liu (2016) in
two respects. First, the process for zt is in levels rather than in logarithms to prevent the expected
value of productivity to be different from the deterministic steady-state value through a Jensen’s
inequality effect.9 Second, we use the timing assumption common in the uncertainty literature
(e.g., Bloom (2009); Basu and Bundick (2017) according to which volatility shocks have a delayed
impact on the distribution of productivity shocks. We do so to underscore that real options effects
are absent even under a timing assumption that is, in principle, favorable to wait-and-see effects (cf.
Schaal (2017, footnote 12)). As in Leduc and Liu (2016), we specify the process for σt in logs to
ensure that the standard deviation remains positive.10
Job/firm creation. There is an infinite number of homogeneous entrepreneurs with the ability to
post vacancies and create intermediate goods producing firms. Free entry in the matching market is
assumed, which implies that
κ = htJt , (10)
9Quantitatively this effect is very small, but it would make the analysis of the mechanisms discussed in this paper
less transparent. Although zt could in principle turn negative with the specification in levels, we found that this does not
happen even in a simulation of 10 million observations.
10We also tried a level process for σt as in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011), for instance. This does not affect the
results presented in this paper.
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where κ is the vacancy-posting cost, ht the hiring rate (defined above), and Jt the beginning-of-
period value of a match from the point of view of the entrepreneur (“the firm value”). The latter is
given by
Jt = xzt−wNt +βEt [Jt+1(1−δ )] , (11)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on time-t information, and wNt
is the wage, which is determined by Nash bargaining.
Nash-bargained wages Under Nash bargaining, the wage is given by11
wNt = (1−ω)χ +ω (xzt +β (1−δ )κEt [θt+1]) , (12)
where ω is the bargaining weight of the worker.12
Final goods producing firms and retailers. These two sectors are not interesting for us, since
we focus on the flexible price version of Leduc and Liu (2016); keeping them in the model ensures
our calibration is comparable. Effectively, firms in these sectors simply produce the final goods and
sell them to households earning a markup η/(η−1), where η is the elasticity of substitution. This
implies that the relative price of intermediate goods is x = (η−1)/η .
11See online appendix OA .1 for a derivation.
12Leduc and Liu (2016) allow for real wage rigidity to address the Shimer puzzle (cf. Shimer (2005)) and generate
empirical reasonable volatilities of vacancies and unemployment. As our interest here is qualitative in nature, extrinsic
rigidity makes the analysis less transparent. This is especially important regarding wage setting, since this will play a
key role in understanding the results as will become clear when we discuss the results.
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2.4 Key equations summarized
The relevant set of equations is the following system of four equations and four endogenous
variables, Jt , wNt , nt , and θt
Jt = xzt−wNt +βEt [Jt+1(1−δ )] , (13)
wNt = (1−ω)χ +ω (xzt +β (1−δ )κEt [θt+1]) , (14)
nt = (1−nt−1 +δnt−1) f (θt)+(1−δ )nt−1, (15)
κ = h(θt)Jt , (16)
with the two additional unknown, ust and vt , given by u
s
t = 1−nt−1 +δnt−1, and vt = θtust .
2.5 Calibration and solution method
The calibration follows Leduc and Liu (2016) as closely as possible.13 The calibrated parameter
values and the associated targets/outcomes are reported in Table 1. We also use the same solution
method, that is, third-order pruned perturbation.
3 Volatility in the standard search-and-matching model
The main objective of this section is to present and analyze the effect of volatility shocks in the
standard search-and-matching (SaM) model. To this end, we proceed in four steps. First we illustrate
IRFs of the baseline model, and outline a distinction between the total effects and those that arise
purely from anticipation. As we will see, increased uncertainty generally leads to a decline in the
firm value and a rise in unemployment. However, the results are more complex with respect to
variables such as labor market tightness and wages. Next, we provide a simple two-period version
of the model to illustrate when an option-value channel may emerge, and show that these conditions
13There are some slight discrepancies that are unavoidable. For instance, with risk neutrality, the calibrated value of
the disutility of labor parameter, χ , is slightly different than with log utility. Also, with utility linear in consumption
there is no difference between disutility of labor and unemployment benefits and our χ parameter captures both.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Wage
Parameter Interpretation Source/target Nash Linear
β Discount factor Ann. interest rate of 4% 0.99 0.99
ψ Efficiency of matching Unemployment rate of 6.4% 0.645 0.645
x Markup Markup of 11% 0.9 0.9
δ Separation rate JOLTS database 0.1 0.1
ω Workers barg. power Steady-state wage relation 0.5 0.915
α Elasticity of matching Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) 0.5 0.5
κ Vacancy posting cost 2 % of steady-state output 0.14 0.14
χ Disutility of working ηθ ,z equal to 7.051 0.751 0.645
ρz Persist. of agg. product. Leduc and Liu (2016) 0.95 0.95
ρσ Persist. of uncertainty Leduc and Liu (2016) 0.76 0.76
σz Std. agg. product. shock Leduc and Liu (2016) 0.01 0.01
σσ Std. uncertainty shock Leduc and Liu (2016) 0.392 0.392
Notes. This table lists the parameter values of the baseline SaM model with both types of wage setting. The
targeted value of ηθ ,z, the steady-state elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity,
is implied by Leduc and Liu’s (2016) calibration for the model with Nash bargaining and linear utility. One period
in the model corresponds to one quarter. Parameter values are rounded to three decimal places.
are not met in the SaM framework. Thus, the decline in economic activity revealed by the IRFs is
not due to an option-value effect. Third, we show that several of the features of the baseline IRFs
disappear once we dispense with Nash bargaining. In particular, a wage that is linear in productivity
prohibits any anticipation effects. This finding provides an important insight to understand the IRFs
for the model with Nash-bargained wages. Lastly, we explain just why Nash bargaining – when
present – can have non-trivial implications for the transmission of uncertainty shocks.
3.1 Impulse response functions
Figure 1 plots the IRFs of an increase in the standard deviation of the productivity innovation – i.e.,
an uncertainty shock.14 We plot two different types of IRFs, both of which are calculated around
the stochastic steady state.15 The first, the total volatility IRF, of variable xt is the standard IRF that
14More precisely, but less readably, figure 1 plots the IRFs of a unit-increase in εσ ,t , that is, to the innovation of the
time-varying standard deviation of the productivity innovation.
15The starting point does potentially matter in a nonlinear model. Here we follow the literature and suppose that the
shock occurs after a long period during which no shocks have materialized at all (cf. Born and Pfeifer (2014)).
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Figure 1: IRFs for uncertainty shock in standard SaM model under Nash Bargaining





























































































Notes: The “total volatility” IRFs plot the change in the period-0 expected values of the indicated variables in response
to a unit-increase in εσ ,t . The “pure uncertainty” IRFs display how the economy responds when agents think volatility
will increase, but the higher volatility actually never materializes.
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plots Eτ [xτ+ j], where τ is the period the shock occurs and j = 0,1, · · · . These IRFs describe what
happens on average (or, equivalently, in expectation) during periods of enhanced volatility. Whereas
the impact of a period-τ shock on variables in subsequent periods does not depend on realizations of
future shocks in linear models, this is not the case in nonlinear models. This means that one has to
integrate over all possible future realizations to calculate the expected impact of a period-τ shock.16
The second IRF, the pure uncertainty IRF, plots the response to the economy when agents
perceive an increase in future volatility, but this increase never materializes. For an IRF that uses
the stochastic steady state as the starting point, this means that agents think σt is higher than normal
during the period following the shock and act accordingly, but period after period, zt , still takes
on its steady-state value. Thus, the pure uncertainty IRF measures the effects of an increase in
purely anticipated uncertainty. The resulting effects arise solely due to agents’ responses to changed
expectations about the future. These changed expectations are described by the total volatility IRF.
Thus, the latter type of IRFs are essential to understand the first kind (and vice versa).17
The key observations about figure 1 are the following. First, the value of a firm falls and the
unemployment rate increases. This is true for both types of IRFs. Second, there are important
qualitative differences between the two types of IRFs. Specifically, whereas the pure uncertainty
IRFs follow the usual monotone pattern, the total volatility IRFs display an inverted u-shape.
Moreover, for the wage rate and tightness variable, the two types of IRFs even have different signs
at some horizons. Note that both types of IRFs take on negative values initially for these two
variables.18 However, for the wage rate and the labor market tightness, the response of the total
volatility IRFs turns positive soon after the shock occurs whereas this is not the case for the pure
uncertainty IRF. As explained in the next section, this observation is important to understand why
the firm value drops in the matching model with Nash bargaining when volatility increases or is
16These total volatility IRFs are calculated using the technique of Andreasen et al. (2018).
17This relationship is also important to understand first-order moment “news” shocks. For example, how the
economy responds to news that productivity will be higher in the future requires understanding how the economy
responds to higher productivity.
18By construction, the two IRFs take on the same value in the period when the shock occurs, since our timing
assumption implies that uncertainty shocks have no effect in that period. Thus, the first-period responses for both types
of IRFs are purely based on expectations on what will happen and those expectations are the same.
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anticipated to increase.
3.2 The evasive option value
To assist understanding the IRFs presented in the last section, we make use of a very simple example
to illustrate why and when an increase in uncertainty increases the option value of postponing
investment. As we will see, there cannot be an option-value channel operating within this framework,
and the simple example developed here is useful to make this point as clearly as possible.
Option value of postponing investment. The option value to wait is most transparent under risk
neutrality, as risk aversion will add additional aspects to the analysis, such as precautionary savings
and changes in risk premia. Thus, we consider a risk neutral agent. This agent can choose between
the following two investment paths. The first possibility consists of investing immediately and
earning a known return R1 in the first period and a stochastic return R2 in the second period. The
latter return will only become known in period 2. Alternatively, the agent can postpone making a
decision. In this case, she would instead bring the money to the bank in the first period and earn a
return equal to R∗ < R1. In the second period, the agent will invest in the project only if R2 > R∗ ≥ 0.
The expected values of the two strategies – commit and wait – are given by
Jcommit = R1 +βE[R2], (17)
Jwait = R∗+βE[max{R2,R∗}]. (18)
How does increased volatility, i.e., an increase in the standard deviation of R2, affect the en-
trepreneur’s choice when we keep the expected value of R2 the same? It obviously does not affect
the value of Jcommit. However, it increases the value of Jwait. The reason is that by waiting the
entrepreneur is ensured of a minimum return, namely R∗, but she benefits from the higher upward
potential of the investment project.
We want to highlight two features that are important. First, the decision is irreversible. That
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is, if the entrepreneur starts the project in period 1, then she cannot unwind the project in period
2 and get a refund. Second, the projects are mutually exclusive. That is, the entrepreneur has to
adopt either the commit or the wait strategy. While we will elaborate more on these aspect below,
Bernanke (1983) provides a more general treatment.
Option value of waiting in search-and-matching models. For comparison purposes, consider
a two-period version of the standard SaM model.19 An entrepreneur who invests by creating a
vacancy in period 1 faces the cash flow
−κ +h1 (R1 +βE[R2])︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
, (19)




where we have assumed – for simplicity – that the rate of return on the alternative period 1 investment
is equal to 0. Investments are irreversible in the SaM model, since κ is paid upfront. Does this
mean that individual entrepreneurs in SaM models have a benefit of waiting when the expected
volatility of period 2 profits increases keeping its expected value constant? The answer is no. First,
the free-entry condition implies that expected profits are equal to zero in every time period and in
every state of the world; that is, −κ + htJt = 0, t = 1,2. Since profits from vacancy-posting are
expected to always be equal to zero, the upward potential that increased the value of waiting in the
example discussed above does not exist here. That is, with free entry the last two equation can be
19Note that what matters for economic activity in the standard SaM model with exogenous separation are the
expected profits from posting a vacancy, not those associated with an existing match. That is, we consider the decision
of an unmatched entrepreneur.
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written as
−κ +h1J1 = 0, (21)
βE[max{−κ +h2J2,0}] = βE[max{0,0}] = 0. (22)
Thus, although job creation is irreversible, it is not sufficient to generate an option-value channel.20
Key for the result that the expected value of vacancy posting is zero is that investing now and
waiting are not mutually exclusive. That is, posting a vacancy this period does not prevent vacancies
being posted next period. It would not make a difference if these choices were mutually exclusive
for the entrepreneur herself, that is, if one assumed that each entrepreneur can be involved in one
project only. The reason is that there are always other entrepreneurs who can pursue the alternative
choices, exhausting all positive profits. Thus, what is mutually exclusive applies to the economy as
a whole, and not to individual agents.
In section ??, we will show that it is possible for the SaM model to have an option-value
mechanism if one assume that each matched entrepreneur cannot be involved in more than one
project and the mass of entrepreneurs is finite. This is sufficient to create an environment in which
projects are mutually exclusive and expected profits are potentially positive.
Figure 1 demonstrates that there is one aspect of the properties of the SaM model developed in
section 2 that is quite different from the analysis based on the simple two-period setup. Specifically,
figure 1 documents that the value of a match, Jt , declines in response to an anticipated uncertainty
shock, whereas the value of investing early in the two-period model, J1, remains unaffected.
One might conjecture that the reason behind this decline in Jt is an increase in the option value
20Irreversibility refers to the posting costs. Here, we have assumed that the entrepreneur who invests in period 1 will
have some positive cash flow equal, R2 ≥ 0, in period 2 for sure. That is, there is no incentive to end the relationship
early endogenously. But R2 could be negative, for example, with sticky wages. Allowing for endogenous discontinuation
means that the net present value of the surplus flows accruing to the entrepreneur investing in period 1 is given by
−κ +h1R1 +βE[max{R2,0}] =−κ +h1J1 = 0. (23)
The convexity introduced by endogenous job destruction implies that an increase in anticipated uncertainty would raise
the value of J1, which in turn would lead to an increase in vacancies in period 1. That is, the outcome is the opposite of
that predicted by an option value of waiting mechanism.
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of waiting (Leduc and Liu, 2016, p. 21). But note that Jt in the matching model corresponds to
Jcommit in the simple model; that is, to the value of investing now. In contrast, the idea of the option
value to wait is that the value of the strategy that involves waiting and potentially investing later
increases. In the terminology of our stylized setup, an increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in
Jwait, not to a decrease in Jcommit.
3.3 If it is not an option value, what is it?
Our discussion above made clear that the environment for the entrepreneur in the SaM model does
not satisfy the conditions that generate an option value of postponing job creation. But it is still the
case that volatility shocks lower the match value and increase the unemployment rate. The question
is why does this happens, and whether the reason still can be given some option-value interpretation.
Note that in the two-period model, we assumed that E[R2], i.e. expected profits, remain the
same when we increased the expected volatility. The same is true for expected values of future
productivity in the full dynamic models. Thus, it must be the case that the behavior of wages is
essential for understanding the results in figure 1.
The Nash bargaining assumption adopted in Leduc and Liu (2016) is just one of many possibili-
ties and it is not an essential characteristic of the matching mechanism. Nash bargaining introduces
feedback between wages and market tightness. That is, wages are higher when more vacancies
are expected to be posted, and wages in turn affect match value and, thus, vacancy posting. This
feedback makes the model somewhat harder to understand.
Now, an important objective of this paper is to understand the role of matching frictions for the
impact of volatility shocks, both when they do and when they do not realize. As will become clear
below, we do need a model with more than two periods. But it will help if we strip the model to its
bare essentials. Those essentials are, firstly, that neither workers nor entrepreneurs find a match
with probability one. And, secondly, that both sides face congestion effects, that is, the probability
of finding a match decreases if more of your type are searching; that is, the matching function is
concave in both arguments. Nash bargaining is not one of those essentials. To better understand
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the role of uncertainty in SaM, we first consider the case in which not only the expected value of
productivity but also the expected value of profits remains unchanged when volatility increases. This
can be easily accomplished if one assumes that wages are a linear function of current productivity,
zt , only.21 Specifically,
wt = ωxzt +(1−ω)χ. (24)
Matching frictions and anticipated volatility changes. Under this wage rule one can derive a
useful, analytical expression for Jt .









(1−β (1−δ ))(1−β (1−δ )ρz)
. (25)
Proof. See online appendix OA .
Thus, Jt is a linear function of zt . The formula directly makes clear that an increase in anticipated
uncertainty has no effect on Jt . If the anticipated increase in volatility does not materialize then
Jt will not change in subsequent periods either even when agents continue to anticipate higher
uncertainty in the future. Consequently, none of the other variables will be affected either as is
documented in figure 2 which plots the two types of IRFs for an increase in uncertainty under the
linear wage rule.22
The fact that the IRFs associated with an anticipated increase in volatility are zero in every
21This linear specification can be motivated by an alternating-offers game (Freund and Rendahl, 2020). A key aspect
of this game is that separation is not a credible threat. Consequently, agreement is reached within the period and market
tightness does not affect the outcome. As long as agreement has not been reached, the worker is not working. The
parameter χ captures the utility of not working during the negotiations. See Hall and Milgrom (2008) for details. Also,
this wage coincides exactly with that of Jung and Kuester (2011), in which the Nash product, (wt −χ)ω(xzt −wt)1−ω ,
is maximized.
22The parameters of the version with linear wages are chosen to make it comparable to that with Nash bargaining.
Specifically, we choose the outside option χ such that the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to productivity
is unchanged relative to Nash bargaining. To this end, we exploit the close relationship between that elasticity and
the fundamental surplus, xz− χ , as defined by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017). Given the remaining parameters, the
bargaining weight ω is then pinned down by the steady-state version of equation (24). Parameter values are given in
Table 1.
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Figure 2: IRFs for uncertainty shock in standard SaM model with linear wage rule































































































Notes: The “total volatility” IRFs plot the change in the period-0 expected values of the indicated variables in response
to a unit-increase in εσ ,t . The “pure uncertainty” IRFs display how the economy responds when agents think volatility
increases, but the higher volatility actually never materializes.
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period allows us to draw a strong conclusion. That is, the nonlinearity of the matching function by
itself does not generate an employment effect in response to an increase in anticipated uncertainty.
Consequently, there is also no option-value channel associated with the pure anticipation effect of
an increase in uncertainty.
But increased volatility will make Jt more volatile, which in turn renders matching probabilities
more volatile too. We therefore explore next whether the nonlinearities of the matching function
could be such that increases in volatility affect the expected values of employment during the period
of elevated uncertainty.
Matching frictions and realized volatility changes. How can we expect an increase in the
standard deviation of productivity shocks to affect values of key variables in the model during the
period of higher volatility? Given the linearity of Jt , the total volatility IRF of Jt will also be zero.
However, as demonstrated by figure 2, there are increases in the expected values of market tightness,
θt , the hiring rate, ht , and the unemployment rate, ut . But it has no effect on expected values of the



















Recall that α is the curvature parameter in the matching function. The hiring rate, ht , is a convex
function of Jt , for any value of α ∈ (0,1). For our linear wage function this means that it is also
convex in zt . Consequently, a rise in volatility then leads to an increase in expected values. To see
why reductions in Jt matter more for the hiring rate, ht , than increases in Jt , just consider a drop in
Jt to (almost) zero and an increase of the same size. The first change will push ht towards infinity
whereas the second event simply halves the hiring rate.
Tightness, θt , is also a convex function of zt for any value of α ∈ (0,1). When Jt is small, for
instance, an increase in Jt leads to small increases in vacancies. The reason is that small values of Jt
are associated with low values of vt . This implies a high marginal “productivity” of the matching
function so that small changes in the level of vt are sufficient to restore the equilibrium conditions.
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By contrast, ft can either be a convex or a concave function of zt depending on the value of α .
Our results are based on α = 1/2 in which case the job finding rate is linear in Jt and, thus, in zt .
This explains why the total volatility IRF for ft is zero at all forecast horizons. The reason for the
ambiguity and the dependence on the value of α is that the hiring rate is inversely related to Jt but
the job finding rate is inversely related to the hiring rate. Whether ft is a convex or concave function
of Jt depends on which inverse relationship is stronger.
We now turn our attention to the effect of uncertainty on the employment rate, nt . We repeat its
law of motion for convenience.
nt = (1−δ )nt−1 +(1− (1−δ )nt−1) ft .
Although ft always becomes more volatile, its expected value remains the same when α = 1/2. But
the total volatility IRFs indicate that this higher volatility is associated with a higher unemployment
rates and, thus, lower employment rates. Why does an increase in the volatility of ft reduce the
expected future values of nt? The reason is that the higher values of the job finding rate are expected
to occur during expansions when fewer workers are searching for a job. Consequently, the impact
on the employment rate will be smaller. By contrast, the lower values of the job finding rate will
have a bigger impact because they are expected to occur during recessions when lots of workers are
searching for a job.23 Note that the effect is non-monotone. In the period of the shock, the mass of
searching workers, 1− (1−δ )nt−1, is fixed and, hence, a higher volatility of ft has no effect on
expected employment. In the next few periods, this mass is still close to its steady-state value. But
as time goes on, the asymmetric effect becomes more important when zt shocks push unemployment
either up or down. This explains the inverted u-shaped pattern for the unemployment IRF.
Why increased uncertainty might reduce unemployment due to matching frictions. When
α = 1/2, then the increased volatily has no effect on the average value of ft . However, when
α < 1/2, then ft is a convex function of zt , which implies that the expected values of the job finding
23See Hairault et al. (2010) and Jung and Kuester (2011).
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rate increases. So the question arises whether at low values of α a rise in uncertainty leads to an
expected decrease in unemployment because the increase in the average job finding rate dominates
the downward effect on unmployment discussed above. Figure 3 plots the results when α = 0.2.
Since ft is now a convex function of zt , the period of higher volatility correspond to higher average
job finding rates. Initially – as the unemployment rate is still close to its steady-state value – this
does indeed push the unemployment rate down. This result illustrates that matching frictions by
themselves can even lead to decreases in the unemployment rate, although the value of α has to
lower than values typically assumed in the literature (cf. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). Of
course, an anticipated increase in volatility will still have no effect when α < 1/2. This is another
example that illustrates how the two types of higher volatility experiments generate quite different
outcomes.
3.4 The non-trivial implications of Nash bargaining
The analysis above indicates that the nonlinearities of the SaM model can generate a rich set of
results to volatility shocks, even when the expected match value Jt is not affected. It also makes
clear, however, that matching frictions by themselves do not give a reason why the economy should
respond to anticipated increases in uncertainty, that is, when agents believe a period of higher
volatility lies ahead, but it never materializes.
These “pure uncertainty” IRFs play an important role in the literature, because they would
provide the theoretical counterpart of changes in empirical measures of “perceived” uncertainty like
the ones used in Leduc and Liu (2016). As shown in section 3.1, with Nash bargaining such an
anticipated increase in uncertainty does lead to a reduction in match value and a recession. What is
it about Nash Bargaining that changes the results discussed above? The answer actually follows
quite directly from the results for the linear wage rule and the expression of the Nash-bargained
wage rate, which we repeat here for convenience,
wNt = ωxzt +(1−ω)χ +ωβ (1−δ )Et [κθt+1]
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Figure 3: IRFs for uncertainty shock in standard SaM model with linear wage rule & low α































































































Notes: The “total volatility” IRFs plot the change in the period-0 expected values of the indicated variables in response
to a unit-increase in εσ ,t . The “pure uncertainty” IRFs display how the economy responds when agents think volatility
increases, but the higher volatility actually never materializes. The value of α is equal to 0.2.
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This expression makes clear that the the wage does not only increase with the period-t benefits
of not working, χ , and with current-period firm revenues, xzt . A higher expected value of future
tightness likewise implies a higher wage rate this period.24
Now, as discussed above, search frictions, and specifically the convexity of tightness, mean that
the higher volatility in Jt increases the expected values of future tightness. With Nash bargaining,
this expectation translates into higher current wage rates.25 Higher current wages lead to a reduction
in match value. The following proposition proves more formally that the match value J is concave
in productivity under Nash bargaining.
Proposition 2. Suppose that productivity is constant, zt = zt+1 = · · · = z, and wages are set by
Nash bargaining, then J(z) is a strictly concave function, and θ(z) is a strictly convex function.
Proof. See online appendix OA .
Intuitively, the free-entry condition together with the nonlinearity of the matching function
ensures that θ is a convex function of J. Moreover, as the Nash bargained wage depends positively
and linearly on tightness, the wage function is also convex in J. The concavity of J then follows
from the convexity of the wage function.26
The concavity of J(zt) implies that its expected value should decrease if zt becomes more
volatile. But the story does not end here. The reduction in Jt leads to an immediate reduction in
vacancy posting, which in turn puts an immediate downward effect on tightness and a reduction
in the job finding rate. If one considers a period with an anticipated increase in volatility that








That is, what matters for wage setting in terms of forward-looking behavior is the expected value of the product of next
period’s job finding rate and next period’s firm value.
25In online appendix OB we show that if households are risk averse, then additional interaction effects come into
play. In particular, whenever the marginal utility of consumption is elevated, this lowers the Nash-bargained wage rate.
26The above reasoning relies on the properties of J, and not productivity z. Thus to complete the argument it ought
to be noticed that tightness will always be a convex function of z unless J is sufficiently concave. However, if this is the
case, labor market tightness as well as wages are concave functions of z. Since w enters the match value negatively, this
would imply that J must be convex, which is a contradiction. Thus J is concave in z. See section 3.3 for a discussion of
a similar relationship between θ and z even when J is a linear function of z.
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never materializes, then the expected increase in tightness due to higher volatility of Jt will never
materialize either. Consequently, there is just the the downward effect on firm value, tightness, and
the wage rate, consistent with the IRFs given in Figure 1. There will be an instantaneous jump
down in these variables and a gradual return towards the (stochastic) steady state. What about the
total volatility effect? For tightness we have the effect that works through the wage rate, that is,
tightness drops because of the expected increase in the wage rate. This channel is strongest just
after the shock and then leads to a monotonically declining effect. But we also have the effect
from the nonlinearity of the matching function which implies that tightness is a convex function.
This latter feature gives rise to an upward effect on average tightness during periods of higher
volatility. The result is a non-monotone effect that is small at first.27 Initially, the negative effect
must dominate, but expected tightness becomes positive after two periods when it is overturned by
the effect working through the nonlinearity of the matching function. The wage rate IRF leads the
change in the expected value for tightness which follows directly from equation (12). The firm value
is simply the mirror image of the wage rate since expected productivity actually does not change.
Note that it must be the case that the total volatility IRF for tightness turns positive at some
point. If it would never turn positive, then the wage response would not turn positive either, which
means that firm value would not have dropped; but then tightness should not have fallen in the first
place.
4 A search-and-matching model with option value
Section 3.2 showed that even though job creation is an irreversible investment, the standard search-
and-matching (SaM) model does not have the other ingredient needed to generate an option-value
channel – the mutual exclusivity of investment projects – since the choice to create a job this period
does not restrict job creation in the future. In this section we propose an amended SaM model
according to which elevated uncertainty does raise the value of waiting. Before specifying that
27If the shock occurs in period τ , then zτ+1 will be more volatile because εz,τ+1 is more volatile. But zτ+2 will be
more volatile because εz,τ+2 and zτ+1 will be more volatile.
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model, we briefly discuss a simple experiment which demonstrates that an option-value channel is
possible, in principle, simply by assuming that the mass of available entrepreneurs is finite. This
example clarifies the crucial role of the free-entry condition in eliminating the option-value channel.
It also serves as a stepping stone to understanding our proposed model.
Consider the model of section 2 with a linear wage rule. Productivity is constant and the
economy starts out in steady state. We assume that the mass of entrepreneurs, while finite, is large
enough for the steady state to be unaffected. In period t, the economy encounters the following
increase in anticipated volatility. Aggregate productivity in some state (or states) of period t +1 is
(expected to be) sufficiently great for the profits associated with posting a vacancy in that state to be
strictly positive. In particular, there are simply not enough unmatched entrepreneurs available in the
entire economy for these profits to be exhausted due to entry. That is, the free-entry condition no
longer holds in that state, as
ht+1Jt+1−κ > 0,
whereas it holds with equality in all other states.28
In period t, an idle entrepreneur is now faced with the choice of either posting a vacancy
immediately, or waiting in the hope of entering when profits are strictly positive. As long as profits
in period t fall short of the expected profits in period t +1, waiting is obviously a dominant strategy.
Vacancies in period t therefore decline, and the hiring rate increases. This remains true until profits
in period t are exactly equal to the expected profits of entry in period t + 1. That is, until the
arbitrage condition
htJt−κ = Et [ht+1Jt+1−κ]> 0,
is satisfied. Thus, the (expectation of) positive profits available in period t +1, caused by a shortage
28Note, in particular, that the prospect of a large fall in aggregate productivity leaves expected profits unaffected,
since such a shock lead to an increase in the slack of the constraint on the available number of entrepreneurs.
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of available entrepreneurs, gives rise to positive profits in period t; profits that are generated by
a rise in the hiring rate, ht , which is accomplished through a decline in vacancies. In short, a
perceived increase in future uncertainty can give rise to an option value of waiting and a decline in
economic activity in the present, if that increased volatility means that the constraint on the number
of available is expected to be binding in some future state of the world.
While this simple extension of the baseline model is sufficient to give rise to an option-value
channel, is suffers from several disadvantages. Firstly, for an option-value mechanism to operate
in this environment, one had to postulate the existence of states of the world in which there is
literally nobody left to create jobs, regardless of how great the associated profits are. That seems
implausible. More broadly, the distribution of shocks must be such that the free-entry condition is
binding in some states but not in others. That is, the presence of option-value effects is sensitive
to assumptions about the size of shocks. Further, once a state characterized by sufficiently high
aggregate productivity is expected to materialize, the value of waiting becomes positive for all
entrepreneurs.29 Finally, the requirement that the constraint on the number of entrepreneurs be
occasionally binding complicates the numerical analysis.
4.1 A model with firm heterogeneity
So what can be done? Clearly, we have to maintain the assumption of a finite mass of entrepreneurs,
lest free entry drive expected profits to zero in all states of the world, eliminating the possibility
of an option-value channel. At the same time, it is desirable to have an internal solution. This can
be accomplished by having heterogeneity in productivity among idle entrepreneurs. This simple
modification gives rise to a framework in which there are always idle entrepreneurs, but only some
that find it profitable to enter the matching market. The measure that finds it profitable to do so is
endogenous and time-varying. At the same time, the option value of waiting remains present since
higher uncertainty gives entrepreneurs upward potential, whereas they are shielded from downward
29That is, until the arbitrage condition is satisfied, at which all entrepreneurs are indifferent between entering across
periods/states.
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risk, precisely because they can always choose not to post vacancies.
4.1.1 Setup
Introducing heterogeneity into the main framework necessitates some additional assumptions. In
particular, there is a finite, and constant, mass of potential entrepreneurs, ϒ. In every period, each
unmatched entrepreneur receives an iid productivity draw, a, from the cumulative distribution
function, F(a), with mean zero. The distribution is uniform on the interval A = [−a,a], with
a =
√
3σa, where σa is the standard deviation of a.30
If an entrepreneur is successful in creating a new firm, the idiosyncratic productivity draw, a, is
realized and lasts permanently throughout the match. As in the baseline model, the firm is then only
dissolved by exogenous separation, which occurs at a rate δ . In case of separation the entrepreneur
“dies” and gets replaced.31 If, on the other hand, the entrepreneur is unsuccessful in creating a firm –
by choice or by chance – the same entrepreneur receives a new productivity draw is made in the
subsequent period. Thus, “death” can only occur after a match has taken place. As a consequence,
only entrepreneurs with a high enough value for a will find it worthwhile to pay the cost of posting
a vacancy. Others may instead find it more beneficial to wait for the opportunity of receiving a
better draw in the future. That is, there is scope for an option value of waiting, without having to
rely on there being states of the world in which there are no entrepreneurs left who conceivably
could post further vacancies.
With idiosyncratic productivity shocks the firm value is given by32
Jt(a) = (1−ω)(x(zt +a)−χ)+β (1−δ )Et [Jt+1(a)]. (26)
30Results with a Normal distribution are similar and are reported in online appendix OD.2.
31It should be noted that as entrepreneurs in a match may die – and will therefore not receive a prospective new
draw of a – there is no “accidental option value” emerging in case of separation. This assumption is made to allow for
a transparent analysis, in which the option value has no accidental benefits, but can only be realized by choice, and
carries no noteworthy quantitative implications.
32The notation is somewhat simplified in that it does not specify that a is the draw that the entrepreneur received in
the period the match was created. Over time, firm level productivity, zt +a, only varies with aggregate productivity, zt .
We also do not add a subscript to indicate that the level of a is firm specific.
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In the baseline model, the free-entry condition ensured that the value of an idle entrepreneur is
always zero. In the current case, by contrast, the measure of entrepreneurs, ϒ, is finite, and the value


















Define ât as the productivity cut-off that renders an entrepreneur indifferent between entering or
not; that is,
ht(Jt(ât)−βEt [JUt+1])−κ = 0. (29)
Moreover, denote a∗t as the expected value of a conditional on a being above the cutoff level, and pt
as the probability of such a draw. That is,






adF(a) = Et [a|a≥ ât ]. (31)






Lastly, the number of vacancies are given by
vt = pt(ϒ− (1−δ )nt−1). (33)
Thus, in contrast to the previous framework, the firm value is now provided by equation (26), and
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the free-entry condition is replaced by equation (29); the equations for ht , ft , nt , as well as the
exogenous processes remain the same.
Before providing a qualitative analysis of the option-value channel it is necessary to touch upon
some aspects of the calibration (see section 4.2 for additional details). In particular, our ambition is
to keep the heterogenous-firm version as close as possible to the baseline, and for both frameworks
to coincide – at least with respect to the key variables – at the steady state. In the baseline framework
the cut-off level â is, by construction, zero. Thus, we calibrate the model such that the steady-state
value of â remains at zero for any value of σa. Given the symmetry of the distribution this implies
that p = 0.5. Moreover, following equation (33), and imposing the steady-state values of vacancies,
v, and employment, n, from the baseline model, one finds that ϒ must be set as
ϒ = 2v+(1−δ )n. (34)
Another salient implication of this choice of p is that at the steady state, the measure of idle
entrepreneurs posting a vacancies is equally large as that of idle entrepreneurs that are not. Thus,
the constraint on the number of entrepreneurs is unlikely to be binding even for fairly large shocks,
and we will proceed under the assumption that it indeed never is.
4.1.2 An option value of waiting
The emergence of an option-value channel in this framework is intuitive and visible even in the
absence of aggregate risk. We first explain how the channel emerges only due to idiosyncratic risk,
and then discuss how a similar effect arises from aggregate volatility. In online appendix OC , we
furthermore develop a two-period version of this model with heterogeneous productivity levels
which is helpful in providing some graphical intuition as well as some analytical results.
Idiosyncratic risk. Suppose that there is no aggregate risk and that the cross sectional dispersion
in productivity is zero; that is, σa = 0. Provided that there is a sufficient amount of available








where we dropped time subscripts given the absence of aggregate uncertainty. Consequently, JU = 0,
and the above equation simply replicates the free-entry condition in the standard SaM model. Thus,
with σa = 0, the heterogeneous-firm model nests the baseline.
Suppose instead that σa > 0. If ât was unaffected by this alteration (remaining at zero), so
would the hiring rate, ht . However, the presence of cross-sectional dispersion in productivity implies
that a∗ – i.e. the expected value of the idiosyncratic component conditional upon entry – must
rise above zero. This means that the value of waiting, βEt [JUt+1], is positive as well. Consequently,
an entrepreneur with a = 0 now prefers to wait in the hope of getting a better draw next period.
Consequently, ât will increase until the hiring rate has dropped sufficiently so that the expected
profits of vacancy posting at the new cut-off level equals the value of waiting.33
Would it not be possible that changes in the hiring rate drive the expected value of waiting to
zero? No. If that would be true, then the expected profits of vacancy-posting are equal to zero for an
entrepreneur with a = ât . With idiosyncratic dispersion, however, this agent has some probability
of receiving a draw for a in the future that exceeds ât in which case the expected profits must be
strictly positive.34 The more cross-sectional dispersion, as indicated by σa, the larger the difference
between â and a∗; that is, the stronger the option value of waiting due to idiosyncratic risk, the lower
pt , and the higher the unemployment rate. The leftmost graph in figure 4 illustrates this relationship
between σa and the steady state level of the unemployment rate. As can be seen, the mechanism is
powerful; an increase in the standard deviation of a from zero to 0.01 (that is, one percent of the
33It is of course essential that entrepreneurs have the option to not post a vacancy in the future. That is, expected
profits are always bounded below at zero. This leads to a convex payoff function and Jensen’s inequality then implies
that uncertainty raises expected values.
34With idiosyncratic dispersion, a∗t could be equal to ât , but only if ât is at the upperbound of the distribution, that is,
when nobody would want to post vacancies. This does not happen for any of our parameterizations, because changes in
matching probabilities always ensure an interior solution for ât .
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Steady-state change in agg. prod.
Notes: The panels display key moment properties as a function of the amount of cross-sectional dispersion. The left
panel indicates the steady-state unemployment rate, while the right panel plots the steady-state elasticity of labor market
tightness with respect to aggregate productivity. All other model parameters are kept fixed and are equal to the ones
given in table 1 for the case with the linear wage rule and no cross-sectional dispersion.
output level without idiosyncratic dispersion) increases the steady-state unemployment rate from
6.4% to almost 14%.
Aggregate risk. The presence of aggregate risk also gives rise to an option value of waiting
mechanism, which operates similarly, but not identically nor independently, to the above mechanism.
To understand the nuance, notice that a higher value for zt+1 would increase the value of Jt+1(a),
while a lower value for zt+1 would result in a decline. When wages are linear in productivity and
entrepreneurs die after an exogenous separation, which is the case in this framework, the increase
and decrease in Jt+1 exactly offset each other. Nevertheless there still is an option value of waiting.
The reason is as follows. The increase in zt+1 generally leads to a reduction in the cutoff value
ât+1 (and, hence, in a∗t+1), since total productivity, zt+1 + ât+1, will anyway increase. Similarly, the
decrease in zt+1 generally leads to an increase in ât+1 (and a∗t+1). Consequently, the probability
of entering and thereby benefiting from an increase in Jt+1 is higher than that of the decrease.35
35Phrased in another way, the higher Jt+1 is multiplied by a higher value of pt+1 than the lower Jt+1. See online
appendix OC for an intuitive, graphical exposition using a 2-period version of the model.
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Therefore, an anticipated increase in future aggregate volatility increases the conditional expected




It ought to be noted that the presence of cross-section dispersion – alongside, of course, the
finite measure of entrepreneurs – is necessary for this mechanism to operate at all.36 Indeed,
entrepreneurs can only “benefit” from a higher match value if the profits of entry can be positive.
Absent cross-sectional dispersion (and with a potentially infinite measure of entrepreneurs), the
hiring rate would otherwise adjust to ensure that the expected profits of entry were zero in all time
periods, and in all states of the world, and the option-value channel would close down. Of course,
this reasoning simply echoes the key results of section 3.2, but serves as a useful reminder. The
rightmost graph in figure 4 shows the relationship between the amount of cross-sectional dispersion,
σa, and the steady-state elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity.
Less dispersion implies a higher elasticity, which reflects the fact that dispersion dampens the
movements in the hiring rate.
4.2 Recalibration scheme
An insight from the previous section is that the amount of cross-sectional dispersion, σa, alters some
of the key properties of the model. In particular, a higher value of σa is associated with a higher
steady-state unemployment rate for a given value of aggregate productivity. Yet, a key element of
the calibration strategy of Leduc and Liu (2016) and adopted here is that the theoretical steady-state
unemployment rate matches its empirical counterpart. In addition, the volatility of the hiring rate is
declining in σa. In view of this, we pursue a recalibration strategy which ensures that irrespective of
the chosen value of σa, the model economy matches key empirical targets and features a comparable
degree of aggregate volatility to the baseline model of section 2. Specifically, (i) the steady-state
values of all endogenous variables are unchanged; and (ii) the steady-state elasticity of labor market
36That is, unless we rely on a shock distribution that render the free-entry condition occasionally binding, as
discussed above.
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tightness with respect to aggregate productivity equals the baseline.
The key parameter to obtain the latter target is χ , which controls the value of the worker’s
outside option during bargaining. By choosing larger values for χ when σa is higher, we reduce the
contemporaneous surplus, x(zt +a−χ), which renders the model variables more volatile – offsetting
the lower volatility implied by a wider cross-sectional distribution. Next, for the steady-state rate
of unemployment to be the same as in the baseline model, the steady-state value of the cutoff
level â must be equal to zero for the different values of σa considered.37 The key parameter to
accomplish this is the worker bargaining power, ω . When χ is increased, the share that accrues to
the entrepreneur, i.e., 1−ω , must increase to ensure the same level of steady state vacancy posting.
Lastly, the steady-state total productivity of the average firm is given by z+ a∗. Since a∗
increases with σa, we adjust the value of z downward to compensate for this effect. A benefit of this




, i.e., the difference in the value of a match
at the cutoff relative to the value of an unmatched entrepreneur, is the same across economies.38
Since that term plays a key role in driving the dynamics of the model, this aspect of the recalibration
procedure assists with the interpretation of the results.
Our recalibration scheme imposes a natural range for the values of σa. As σa increases, we
need to increase χ and lower ω . Above a value of σa = 0.003, ω quickly approaches its natural
lower bound of 0. As this is a fairly low value, we adopt it as a benchmark.39 Following our
recalibration procedure, when σa = 0.003, we set χ = 0.757, ω = 0.636, and z = 0.997. The
remaining parameters are unchanged and available in table 1, section 2.5, while the mass of
entrepreneurs ϒ given p = 0.5 is equal to 1.11.
37Recall that ϒ is set such that the fraction of entrepreneurs that enters the matching market is 1/2 in the economy
without cross-sectional dispersion. Online appendix OD.4 provides the results when this fraction is equal to 0.2 instead.
38The calibration strategy involves setting the fraction of output spent on vacancy posting costs in steady-state,
κv/(za∗n), equal to 2%. The adjustment of z ensures that κ is the same across economies, which together with the fact
that h is calibrated to be the same across economies means that J(â)−βJU is the same across economies.
39The amount of idiosyncratic dispersion is small relative to the degree of cross-sectional productivity dispersion
observed in the real world. See, for example, Sterk et al. (2020). It is not surprising that our framework with ex-ante
identical entrepreneurs cannot generate the observed differences which are likely to arise from numerous factors besides
those present in a simplified model as we consider here.
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4.3 Numerical results
Figure 5 plots the IRFs for a volatility shock given σa = 0.003, that is, the upper bound permissible
given the recalibration procedure.40 The following observations immediately stand out. First, and
consistent with the preceding qualitative discussion, an increase in anticipated aggregate uncertainty
causes a recession even though wages are linear in productivity. The anticipation of heightened
future volatility increases the value of waiting, which in turn reduces entry and vacancy-posting,
lowering the job finding rate and, ultimately, pushes up the unemployment rate. Second, the
total volatility effects are much larger than the pure uncertainty effects. This result strengthens
our recommendation, expressed in the context of the baseline model, to consider both types of
IRFs when studying the implications of time-varying volatility. Indeed, the total volatility IRFs
strongly resemble those obtained in the absence of firm heterogeneity, and for similar reasons; the
nonlinearities in the matching function generate a persistent rise in both the unemployment rate and
the hiring rate, as discussed in section 3.
A few subtleties are worth pointing out. For one, in the presence of idiosyncratic dispersion,
aggregate output is no longer proportional to ztnt . The composition of the sample of producing firms
matters, as they vary in their individual productivity levels. Specifically, changes in the number
of vacancies posted occur through changes in the cutoff level, which in turn affects the average
productivity of producing firms. Following a volatility shock, the value of waiting rises on impact
due to anticipation effects. The associated increase in the average productivity level of those firms
that do enter dampens, but does not overturn, the reduction in output due to the fall in employment –
an effect that is absent in the model with homogeneous entrepreneurs.41 However, in the case of
total volatility effects, this dampening effect is short-lived. The sharp rise in the unemployment
rate and the associated increase in vacancy posting (through an increased entry probability) takes
hold, whereupon the average productivity of entrants declines. Consequently, output not only falls
40See online appendix OD.3 for the same set of IRFs given σa = 0.001. Additionally, figure 6 plots the impact and
maximum total volatility effect on the unemployment rate, specifically, as a function of σa.
41Figure OD.3 in the online appendix illustrates that this effect can, in principle, lead to a small initial increase in
output when σa = 0.001.
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Figure 5: IRFs for uncertainty shock in SaM model with cross-sectional dispersion; σa = 0.003
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Notes: The “total volatility” IRFs plot the change in the period-0 expected values of the indicated variables in response
to a unit-increase in εσ ,t . The “pure uncertainty” IRFs display how the economy responds when agents think volatility
will increase, but the higher volatility actually never materializes.
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because of the decline in employment, but also due to composition effects.
Moreover, uncertainty shocks have non-zero effects on the job finding rate. This result stands in
contrast to the baseline model (with linear wages), according to which both the pure and the total
volatility effects on the job finding rate are equal to zero in expectation when the matching elasticity,
α , is equal to 0.5. Here, instead, the presence of a wait-and-see mechanism – specifically the
associated reduction in the entry probability – causes the job-finding rate to decline when perceived
uncertainty rises. The total volatility effect on the job-finding rate is likewise negative, larger, and
more persistent. To see why, recall from the discussion in section 3, that the hiring rate is a convex
function of zt . Equation (29) makes clear that the observed increase in the value of an unmatched
entrepreneur introduces an additional positive effect on the hiring rate, and thus a negative effect on
the average job finding rate.
Quantitative comparison. To evaluate the quantitative impact of uncertainty shocks in the current
framework, we compare our results with those described in section 3.1 for the standard SaM model
with free entry and Nash bargaining (recall that this wage-setting assumption is the key reason why
pure uncertainty shocks have non-zero effects in that model).
Figure 6 illustrates the total volatility effect of an uncertainty shock on the unemployment
rate, both on impact (left graph) and at the maximum (right graph) along the IRF. The effect on
impact is entirely due to anticipation, and the maximum total volatility effect occurs after roughly
eight quarters. The horizontal lines in the two graphs indicate, for comparison purposes, the same
statistics obtained in the baseline model with Nash bargaining. Recall that in the model with
heterogeneity we adopted the linear wage rule and deliberately chose the mass of entrepreneurs, ϒ,
such that the constraint on their number is never binding. Hence, with barely any cross-sectional
dispersion, there should be no quantitatively significant anticipation effects due to a volatility shock.
The figure reveals that, indeed, for very small values of σa, we are essentially back to the model of
section 2 with linear wages.
Nonetheless, even with still relatively little cross-sectional dispersion, volatility shocks can
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Notes: The panels display the initial impact and the maximum total volatility impact of a unit-increase in εσ ,t as a
function of the amount of cross-sectional dispersion, σa. Other model parameters are recalibrated to make the economies
with different values of σa comparable.
generate a substantial effect on unemployment. Thus, a value of σa equal to 0.003 implies that
the entrepreneur with the most productive draw for a is just one percent more productive than the
entrepreneur with the least productive draw. In spite of that, both the initial pure uncertainty effect
as well as the maximum total volatility effect are more than double what is generated in the baseline
model with Nash bargaining.
Robustness checks. In online appendix OD, we discuss the results of several robustness exercises.
Most importantly, our baseline specification of the model assumes that an entrepreneur can post only
one vacancy and then creates a job with probability ht (“stochastic hiring”). An alternative would
be to suppose that the entrepreneur posts 1/ht vacancies and then creates one job with certainty
(“non-stochastic hiring”). In the standard SaM model with risk-neutral entrepreneurs, these two
options generate the exact same model properties. In our modified framework, entrepreneurs are also
risk neutral and the two different specifications imply the same qualitative properties. Quantitatively,
however, when there is both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty, a model with non-stochastic
hiring generates a substantially stronger option-value effect due to elevated volatility than implied
by our baseline specification.
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5 Concluding remarks
The option value of waiting to invest in the presence of uncertainty strikes many as a plausible
mechanism to rationalize the empirical finding that elevated uncertainty negatively impacts economic
activity. Moreover, the popularity of the search-and-matching (SaM) literature underscores the
usefulness of modeling job creation as an investment. Yet, we showed that the usual assumption
in that literature of there being a “potentially infinite number” of entrepreneurs to take advantage
of opportunities in the matching market eliminates any grounds for wait-and-see behavior. The
standard SaM model, therefore, cannot be used to rationalize the effects of uncertainty shocks in
terms of an option-value channel. If, on the other hand, there is a limit on the number of potential
entrepreneurs and they vary in their idiosyncratic productivity levels – two modifications that are
both plausible and can be introduced into the model in a tractable manner – the model properties
completely change. In particular, an increase in perceived volatility then does indeed robustly
increase the option value of waiting, causing a reduction in job creation and higher unemployment.
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